CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK
2009-05-07 第2卷 第4期
Massey UniversityEconomics and Finance
City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK)Department of Accountancy
National Cheng Kung UniversityCollege of Management
Nanyang Technological UniversityDivision of banking and finance, Nanyang Business School
Aachen UniversityDepartment of Finance
Jing Liao Massey UniversityEconomics and Finance
This paper explores the empirical results of the implementation of an independent director system in China, and identifies the advisory role of the board. The results show that firms implement board independence by adding extra members, instead of removing inside directors, except in the case where the board size (before the recruitment of independent directors) has already been too large. It has been found that complex (large and diversified) firms prefer a large board with more independent directors on the board. However, the largest shareholders have a strong incentive to organise a small and insider-controlled board. Although there is a negative relationship between board size, board independence and firm performance, Tobin’s Q increases in relation to board size and board independence for complex firms.
Fang Hu City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK)Department of Accountancy
This paper investigates the replacement and appointment of top executives in a business highly involved by the government and their consequences on firm performance and corporate governance. It provides a dynamic setting to test the value of political connection as prior studies do not discern government interests and incorporate ambiguous institutions and self-selection problems by cross-section test. Using data of China’s listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper finds that the state owner is more likely to replace top executives and appoint a politically-connected executive when SOEs encounter economic distress such as poor ROA, earnings loss, high financial risk, or political distress such as SEC regulation violation. It implies that the politically-connected executive may be considered helpful by the government in response to firm distress. Further, it is found that the political top executives improve firm performance following their appointments and reduce the frequency of executives’ illegal actions, by initiating modification of internal governance structures and mitigating manager’s discretion. And those firms do not have preferential access to resources or government assistances such as fiscal subsidies, tax benefits, or the credit market. All these findings support that political executives could serve as a disciplinary or monitoring mechanism in a political economy lack of external market for corporate control and legal protection for investors, instead of being only a form of bail-out. Their efficacy is based on their administrative power, regulatory expertise and accountability to the government interests. These results provide better understanding of government interests and their impact on corporate governance.
Pinghsun Huang National Cheng Kung UniversityCollege of Management
In this paper, we examine investors’ valuations of corporate cash hoardings and dividend payout to explicitly isolate the monitoring effect from the information effect of corporate disclosure activity. In a sample of 951 firms from 38 countries, we find that cash resources are rewarded with higher market valuation when greater disclosure improves a firm’s transparency. These results suggest that extensive disclosure enhances external monitoring and thus limits insiders’ ability to accumulate cash to expropriate minority shareholders. In further support of the monitoring effect of strong disclosure, we find that dividend payout is valued at a premium in opaque firms where cash is more vulnerable to consumption of private control benefits. Overall, our findings support the disciplinary role of firm-level disclosure policy in corporate governance mechanisms.
Nilanjan Sen Nanyang Technological UniversityDivision of banking and finance, Nanyang Business School
In contrast with the evidence for the US and UK, the percentage of Chinese firms that pay dividends is increasing. We find that the level of dividend payment is positively related to ownership concentration but is negatively related to the percentage of outside directors. We further determine that after paying dividends, these firms issue new equity more often than non-payer while enjoying higher market-to-book ratios. These findings suggest that dividends might substitute for board monitoring for Chinese firms and hence contributes to resolving the conflict of interest between the controlling and minority shareholders.
Wolfgang Breuer Aachen UniversityDepartment of Finance
In a series of cross-country comparisons, we show that national culture is statistically significant in differentiating countries with different corporate governance systems. Using the Schwartz cultural value model and data on corporate governance systems, we analyze the impact of national culture on six dimensions of corporate governance. Countries that have stronger emphasis on the dimensions of Embeddedness, Hierarchy and Mastery are more likely to have a bank-based system, countries with a stronger emphasis on Autonomy, Egalitarianism and Harmony tend to have market-based systems. The findings suggest several implications for the ongoing debate on convergence and divergence of corporate governance systems.
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