CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK
2009-06-22 第2卷 第5期
Martin J. Conyon
University of PennsylvaniaThe Wharton School
HEC MontrealDepartment of Finance
Tilburg UniversityDepartment of Business Law
Charlie X. Cai
University of LeedsLeeds University Business School
Martin J. Conyon University of PennsylvaniaThe Wharton School
This study investigates the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in China's listed firms. The study examines how the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is moderated by the private control of firms, the presence of a majority shareholder and the presence of independent directors on the board. Using a panel of about 1200 Chinese firms per year from 1999 to 2006 we find significant changes in the ownership and control of firms. The private control of firms and the fraction of independent directors on the board have increased considerably over time. The study finds a significant negative association between CEO turnover and firm performance consistent with the agency model. There is evidence that the CEO turnover sensitivity for poor performance is greater in firms that are privately controlled, or have a majority shareholder, or have a greater fraction of independent directors on the board.
Narjess Boubakri HEC MontrealDepartment of Finance
In this paper, we examine the cost of equity capital for politically connected firms. After controlling for several firm- and country-level determinants, our results show that politically connected firms have a lower cost of equity capital than their nonconnected peers. Our results are robust to alternative measures and proxies for the cost of equity capital. We thus provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, suggesting that these firms are generally considered to be less risky than non-connected firms. Our findings imply that the benefits of political connections outweigh their costs. We conjecture that this perception is fueled by the soft budget constraints generally enjoyed by politically connected firms, and by their lower default probability, given the assurance of corporate bailout in the event of financial downturns.
从融资约束的角度来研究公司的现金持有行为是当前公司财务学的的重要课题之一。本文根据Almeida et al(2004)提出的现金-现金流敏感性模型，从资产规模、股利支付和控制权性质三个融资约束分组标准角度研究了我国上市公司的现金持有行为。结论表明，融资受约束和不受约束的公司的现金-现金流敏感性都显著为正，没有表现出明显的差异。特别的，国有企业与民营企业的现金-现金流敏感性都非常的正显著，都面临严重的融资约束问题。一方面由于目前我国资本市场的发展仍不够完善，大多数公司仍面临严重的融资约束；另一方面可能说明我国上市公司普遍存在滥用“自由现金流”的现象。因此本文的结论不能有效的支持融资约束影响了我国上市公司现金持有这一假说，现金-现金流敏感性模型并不能有效区分融资约束与非融资约束公司，其作为检验我国上市公司融资约束假说并不合适。
Jing Li Tilburg UniversityDepartment of Business Law
Following the economic theory of venture capital financing, a corporate governance framework would be economically efficient for VC investments if it can help to reduce the agency costs resulted from information and incentive problems. As a highly successful model in global VC industry, the standard VC investment contracts in the Silicon Valley practice largely embody such framework. By analyzing the currently effective laws and regulations of China that are relevant to the investments by foreign venture capitalists, this paper paints a practical picture of how can foreign VC investors do business in China. It is shown that, the recent (starting from 2005) outflow of a set of new legal norms can be seen as a dividing point for the VC investing practice in China – the previously prevalent mode “offshore structuring, offshore listing” is challenged, and both the investment and exit are gradually pulled onshore. This being said, the current Chinese laws and institutions still cannot fully entertain the contracting and governance model prevalent in the Silicon Valley VC investment practices, and in this light, this paper goes on to discuss, in particular, various strategies that may be availed by foreign VC firms to tap and/or subvert the Chinese laws and regulations when financing Chinese new ventures. Finally, under the theme of globalization and crossborder corporate governance convergence, this paper provides a general comment on the currently applicable Chinese legal framework, and stresses the importance of converging towards efficient legal rules through contracts in the global competitive village.
Charlie X. Cai University of LeedsLeeds University Business School
In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that has taken on renewed importance in recent times.
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