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公司财务--兼并收购
工作论文
2011-01-06 第3卷 第1期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

合作冲突下双主并方并购目标企业的共同时机问题研究

边璐 西安理工大学工商管理学院
扈文秀 西安理工大学工商管理学院
张涛 西安理工大学工商管理学院

澄清公告、大股东控制与公司治理结构

何杰 西南财经大学工商管理学院
林汉川 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院

高级管理层的私有收益与公司的并购行为

李善民 中山大学管理学院
毛雅娟 华南农业大学经管学院
赵晶晶 中山大学管理学院

Collective Monitoring and Investment Illiquidity in Private-Equity Buyouts

Hong-Jen Charles CHIU National Taiwan UniversityCollege of Management
CECG Private Equity Think Tank Carlos-Marc Empire Capital GroupPrivate Equity

Information Asymmetry and Acquisition Premium in Domestic and Cross Border M&As in Emerging Markets

PengCheng (Phil) Zhu Carleton UniversityEric Sprott School of Business


论文摘要

合作冲突下双主并方并购目标企业的共同时机问题研究

边璐西安理工大学工商管理学院
扈文秀 西安理工大学工商管理学院
张涛西安理工大学工商管理学院

本文继承了前人关于并购时机的研究方法,将每个主并方的并购时机确定为:由主并企业与目标企业的进入、退出价值比阈值决定。在此基础上,主要研究了合作并购中,当主并方之间的单独并购的最优时机在时间维度上发生冲突时,如何找到合作条件下主并方的共同并购区域的问题。提出协同补偿作为时机冲突的解决途径,分别确定了先、后进入到各自最优并购区域的企业,在协同补偿存在时的影响阈值变动的内在因素。研究发现:协调补偿可降低进入、退出时的阈值,形成新的次优并购区域。当先进入者的退出阈值的变动速度低于后进入者进入阈值的变动速度时,则满足一定条件的协同补偿可协调主并方并购时机上的冲突。

澄清公告、大股东控制与公司治理结构

何杰西南财经大学工商管理学院
林汉川 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院

本文以2005-2006年沪深两市发生重组并购事件公司的相关数据为样本,以其并购正式公告发布前的相关澄清公告的发布特征为切入,研究了公司治理结构特征与其澄清公告的发布及其真实性之间的关系,发现对最大股东的制衡、机构投资者、独立董事以及董事会规模等企业治理特征,对公司大股东的行为具有一定的约束作用;但当企业内幕信息泄露之后,面对公众质询,第一大股东是选择如实披露还是撒谎,这些治理结构特征却难以发挥作用,而基本决定于第一大股东对其行为后果的利益考量,其持股比例越高,则越倾向于如实披露公司信息。结果进一步提示:对公司大股东行为的研究,不应仅仅着眼于它的持股比例,更重要的还应着眼于对其相关约束机制的考察。

高级管理层的私有收益与公司的并购行为

李善民 中山大学管理学院
毛雅娟 华南农业大学经管学院
赵晶晶 中山大学管理学院

本文在代理成本理论的基础上,着眼于我国高管薪酬管制及公司并购的特殊制度背景,以1999-2007年全部A股上市公司为样本,探讨了公司高管发动的并购行为与谋取个人私有收益行为之间的关联性。实证研究的结果表明,我国上市公司并购已经成为高管谋取私有收益的机会主义行为,通过发动并购行动高管获得了更高的薪酬与在职消费,而高管发动并购事件谋求在职消费的私有收益动机最为明显。本文还发现,目前我国的制度环境下管理者持股水平虽然相对较低,但管理者持股能够缓解高管以谋取私有收益为目的发动低效率并购的行为。

Collective Monitoring and Investment Illiquidity in Private-Equity Buyouts

Hong-Jen Charles CHIU National Taiwan UniversityCollege of Management
CECG Private Equity Think Tank Carlos-Marc Empire Capital GroupPrivate Equity

This paper extends Lerner and Schoar’s (2004) argument on illiquidity puzzle of private equity funds. We examine the roles that investment illiquidity, along with bounded rationality and rent-seeking behavior, plays in private-equity buyouts. Collectively, investors employ club deals to screen out fund managers who might misuse discretionary rights to engage buyout deals. A club deal is launched by a group of private equity firms that pool their assets together, make a joint bid for a buyout target, and monitor the buyout processes collectively. Thus, this paper aims at clarifying whether or not such discretionary rights improve the choice of buyout target by, as well as the performance of private equity funds. We found that the performance of buyout funds persisted and affected the choice of the club deal as the major monitoring mechanism. This paper contributes to our understandings of investment behavior in private equity buyouts as follows. First, the performance of buyout funds has improved for at least two time periods between 1999 and mid-2007. The phenomenon that fund performance affects the choice of club deals is consistent across a variety of private equity funds, such as buyout, venture, growth, and mezzanine funds. Moreover, risk preference does not affect choice of club deals directly; instead, it has a moderating effect on choice of club deals through its interaction with the location of reference point for risk aversion. Finally, both fund size and fund sequence have U-shaped relations to the choice of club deals, while deal value of buyouts is related positively to the choice of club deals.

Information Asymmetry and Acquisition Premium in Domestic and Cross Border M&As in Emerging Markets

PengCheng (Phil) Zhu Carleton UniversityEric Sprott School of Business

In this paper, we test the relationship between information asymmetry and acquisition premium in the mergers and acquisitions of the emerging market firms. Based on a sample of the domestic and cross-border acquisitions in twenty emerging countries between 1990 and 2007, we found a strong positive relationship between the acquisition premium paid to the target firms and the level of information asymmetry of the target firms. In addition, we found that higher level of information asymmetry leads to less cash payment and higher propensity of acquiring majority control (>50%) in the target firms. This evidence supports the theory that acquiring majority control is important in high asymmetric information environment. Thus, the higher the information asymmetry the higher is the premium paid by bidding firms in order to obtain majority control in the target firms. In addition, target firms with high information asymmetry have more valuable private information resources that are not accessible to the public investors. Acquiring firms may pay higher premium for such valuable information resources. The hypothesis is supported by the evidence of both the domestic and the cross-border acquisitions in the emerging markets.


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