中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

公司财务--公司治理
工作论文
2010-09-07 第3卷 第11期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

Tunneling or Propping:Evidence from Connected Transactions in China

Winnie Qian Peng Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyCenter for Business Strategy and Innovation
K.C. John Wei Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyDepartment of Finance
Zhishu Yang Tsinghua UniversityDepartment of Finance

'Rent Seeking Incentives, Political Connections and Organizational Structure: Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China

Charles J. P. Chen China Europe International Business SchoolChina Europe International Business School
Zengquan Li Shanghai University of Finance & EconomicsShanghai University of Finance & Economics
Xijia Su City University of Hong KongDepartment of Accountancy
Zheng Sun Shanghai University of Finance & EconomicsShanghai University of Finance & Economics

Managerial Autonomy, Incentive and Firm Performance Evidence from Investment Climate Survey in China

Xiaoyang Li University of MichiganRoss School of Business

The Impact of Gender Diversity on Corporate Philanthropic Disaster Response: the Moderating role of Institutional Environment

Ming Jia Northwestern Polytechnical UniversityNorthwestern Polytechnical University
Zhe Zhang Xi’an Jiaotong UniversityOrganization & Management Department


论文摘要

Tunneling or Propping:Evidence from Connected Transactions in China

Winnie Qian Peng Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyCenter for Business Strategy and Innovation
K.C. John Wei Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyDepartment of Finance
Zhishu Yang Tsinghua UniversityDepartment of Finance

Friedman et al. (2003) developed a model in which, in equilibrium, controlling shareholders may choose either tunneling or propping depending on the magnitude of an adverse shock and the magnitude of the private benefits of control. In this paper, we employ connected transaction data from China to test the implications of their model. We hypothesize that, when listed companies are financially healthy (in financial distress), their controlling shareholders are more likely to conduct connected transactions to tunnel (prop up) their listed companies and the market reacts unfavorably (favorably) to the announcement of these transactions. Our empirical findings strongly support our hypotheses. Our analysis supports Friedman et al.’s (2003) model by furnishing clear evidence that it is possible that propping and tunneling might occur in the same company but at different times.

'Rent Seeking Incentives, Political Connections and Organizational Structure: Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China

Charles J. P. Chen China Europe International Business SchoolChina Europe International Business School
Zengquan Li Shanghai University of Finance & EconomicsShanghai University of Finance & Economics
Xijia Su City University of Hong KongDepartment of Accountancy
Zheng Sun Shanghai University of Finance & EconomicsShanghai University of Finance & Economics

In this study we examine the incentives for listed family controlled firms in China to establish political connections and their organizational structure as measured by shareholding concentration and composition of board of directors. We hypothesize and find that listed family firms are more likely to establish political connections when the local markets are less developed and the governments are more powerful in allocating economic resources. In particular, firms are more likely to build political connections when local governments suffer from severe budgetary deficits, when they tend to rely on discretionary charges and administrative penalties for raising revenues, and when they have more leeway in granting business subsidies. We also find that controlling shareholders of family firms with political connections tend to concentrate their shareholding and dominate the board of directors so that they can make deals with government officials in secrecy and enjoy the benefits exclusively among themselves.

Managerial Autonomy, Incentive and Firm Performance Evidence from Investment Climate Survey in China

Xiaoyang Li University of MichiganRoss School of Business

This paper attempts to address two questions: First, what is the relationship between a firm’s provision of incentives for its CEO and the CEO’s decision autonomy? Second, how does the CEO’s decision autonomy affect firm performance? Results from a simple principal‐agent model suggest that the relationship between CEO’s decision autonomy and incentive provision may vary across different decisions. We conduct our empirical analysis using World Bank Investment Climate Survey data from China. Our results show that: (i) firm’s use incentive compensation is negatively associated with CEO’s investment decision autonomy but positively associated with labor decision autonomy; and (ii) after controlling for the use of incentive compensation, CEO’s investment decision autonomy dampens, while labor decision autonomy boosts the firm’s performance. We conjecture that different level of agency costs associated with investment decision and labor decision might explain the above distinction.

The Impact of Gender Diversity on Corporate Philanthropic Disaster Response: the Moderating role of Institutional Environment

Ming Jia Northwestern Polytechnical UniversityNorthwestern Polytechnical University
Zhe Zhang Xi’an Jiaotong UniversityOrganization & Management Department

This study conducts a firm-level analysis of the impact that the gender diversity of boards of directors has on corporate philanthropic responses to disasters. We predict a negative relationship between diversity and philanthropic contribution; as the relationship is stronger in listed firms with a better-developed institutional environment. Data were collected on the philanthropic responses of listed Chinese firms to the 5.12 Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. These data support the hypothesized negative relationship and show that it is stronger in higher level vs. lower level marketization environments; the relationship is weaker in listed firms with average gender diversity that have political connections. We also find evidence that agency cost theory explains corporate philanthropic disaster response much better than strategic philanthropic theory since women on boards of directors do not facilitate corporate donation process but rather evaluate the benefits of corporate responses to disasters. These benefits depend on the level of marketization and separation from the government, especially for listed firms with average gender diversity in China. These constructive results provide the first examination of the moderating role of institutional environment on the relationship between gender diversity and corporate philanthropic behaviors. We discuss the implications of this work for further research on diversity considering the interaction with the corporate context.


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