中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

公司财务--公司治理
工作论文
2010-09-16 第3卷 第12期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

Bank Ownership and Executive Compensation and Perquisites: New Evidence from an Emerging Market

Wei Luo Peking UniversityGuanghua School of Management
Yi Zhang Pekjing UniversityPekjing University
Ning Zhu UC DavisGraduate School of Management

Political Factor on the Government Banks Performance -The Application of the Matching Method

Chung-Hua Shen National Taiwan UniversityDepartment of Finance
Chih-Yung Lin National Taiwan UniversityDepartment of Finance

股权分置改革实现了完善上市公司治理的目的吗?-基于我国上市公司股改公司治理短期效应的检验

汪昌云 中国人民大学财政金融学院
孙艳梅 中国人民大学财政金融学院
郑志刚 中国人民大学财政金融学院

高管激励与企业业绩的U形关系——基于边际递减效应和过度激励的研究

左晶晶 复旦大学管理学院
唐跃军 复旦大学管理学院


论文摘要

Bank Ownership and Executive Compensation and Perquisites: New Evidence from an Emerging Market

Wei Luo Peking UniversityGuanghua School of Management
Yi Zhang Pekjing UniversityPekjing University
Ning Zhu UC DavisGraduate School of Management

This paper provides comprehensive description of the practice of corporate executive perquisites (perks) in China, a leading emerging economy. We find that expenses and cash payment related to corporate executive perquisites far exceed the monetary payment to top executives, consistent with the notion that perquisites are used more extensively in emerging markets to motivate and reward corporate executives. In addition to common factors known to influence the level of executive perks, we find a significantly positive link between bank ownership of company shares and executive perquisites. Further analyses suggest that higher level of executive perquisites hurt company operating efficiency and may result from the conflict of interests that banks face as both lenders and shareholders in the emerging markets: banks may choose to side with corporate executives and play less effective monitoring if they are concerned with the security of their loans.

Political Factor on the Government Banks Performance -The Application of the Matching Method

Chung-Hua Shen National Taiwan UniversityDepartment of Finance
Chih-Yung Lin National Taiwan UniversityDepartment of Finance

Many studies report that government-owned banks under-perform the private banks but no studies examine the reasons of this stylized fact empirically in emerging countries during 1993~2007. This study fulfills this gap. For simplicity, the under-performance of government banks is referred to as the GOB effect. Two matching theories, Nearest-Neighbor Matching (Nearest) and Mahalanobis Metric Matching (Mahala), are adopted to seek matched banks sharing similar characteristic variables located in the same countries. We propose three hypotheses, strong policy role hypothesis, weak policy role hypothesis and no policy role hypothesis, which classifies government-owned banks as having strong, weak and no policy roles, to explain the above phenomenon. Regarding to why GOB effects are commonly observed in emerging countries, this study find that government-owned banks, after being mandated to merge with a distressed or non-distressed bank, suffer adverse performance, supporting strong and weak policy role hypothesis. On the contrary, this study also finds government-owned banks undertaking no policy role perform equally as private-owned banks on average, supporting no policy role hypothesis. Next, by supporting the above three hypotheses, we suggest that political considerations indeed depress government bank performance and the GOB effect in emerging countries are coming from the policy roles influence.

股权分置改革实现了完善上市公司治理的目的吗?-基于我国上市公司股改公司治理短期效应的检验

汪昌云 中国人民大学财政金融学院
孙艳梅 中国人民大学财政金融学院
郑志刚 中国人民大学财政金融学院

在控制了其他可能的影响因素,本文通过考察导致股改前后我国上市公司绩效变化的因素,实证检验了股权分置改革对于完善我国上市公司治理结构的作用,从而在一定程度上对股改的政策效果进行了评估。本文的研究表明,股改显著地提高了上市公司的业绩,从而在一定程度上实现了股改的完善公司治理结构的目的;股改预期实现的公司治理完善功能是通过使非流通股和流通股股东形成共同的公司治理利益基础,提升大股东治理的正向作用,以及使机构投资者发挥更加积极的监督制衡作用,并为公司控制权市场的接管威胁实施创造条件得以实现的。股改对于非国有控股公司治理结构的完善更加有效,尽管无论对于国有还是非国有控股上市公司,股改都显著地改善了其绩效。这一结果的出现一定程度上与国有控股公司委托代理链条过长和所有者缺位的问题即使在股改完成后短期内并不会发生显著改变有关。因而,国有控股企业的公司治理结构完善仍然存在巨大的改进空间。

高管激励与企业业绩的U形关系——基于边际递减效应和过度激励的研究

左晶晶 复旦大学管理学院
唐跃军 复旦大学管理学院

在“第二类代理问题”占据主导和隐性激励大量存在的中国市场,上市公司高管看起来显著较低的薪酬和持股比例亦可能导致较为严重的过度激励。有鉴于此,本文首先基于边际递减效应构建理论模型分析高管激励与企业业绩之间的作用逻辑,而后选择2001-2006年中国上市公司的经验证据,具体讨论高管薪酬和股权激励对企业业绩的影响。有别于先前多数有关高管激励的研究文献,本文不仅清晰展现了高管薪酬和股权激励存在的滞后效应;而且进一步在理论分析和实证研究中发现并证实高管薪酬和股权激励存在显著的边际递减效应和过度激励,即高管薪酬激励和股权激励与企业业绩之间在表现为线性正相关关系的同时呈现出左低右高的倒“U”形关系,薪酬和持股比例过低不利于激发高管努力工作改善企业业绩,但薪酬和持股比例过高亦可能导致高管过度激励,同样会对企业业绩造成损害。


      中国金融研究学术网(China Financial Research Network)发表金融研究工作论文和已发表论文的摘要。
      
      如果您如希望按期收到最新的金融研究工作论文和已发表论文的摘要,请访问http://www.cfrn.com.cn,注册即可。
      
      您如果想要发表您的工作论文或已发表论文的摘要,请访问http://www.cfrn.com.cn,注册,登录,然后上传。
      
      中国金融研究学术网不拥有所发表的工作论文和已发表论文摘要的版权。读者可以免费浏览和下载。      
	  
      如果您有任何问题,请联系我们。通过E-Mail发送至:cfrn@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn。或者通过邮寄方式,寄送至:清华大学经济管理学院中国金融研究中心。邮编:100084。
      

Copyright @ 2008 China Center for Financial Research,Tsinghua University. All Rights Reserved.
版权所有 清华大学中国金融研究中心