中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

公司财务--公司治理
工作论文
2011-01-11 第3卷 第17期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

关联交易、盈余质量与股权制衡

罗忠洲 复旦大学金融研究院
周冬华 江西财经大学会计学院会计学院
赵玉洁 复旦大学国际金融系

Beyond Capital Allocation Efficiency

Ping He Tsinghua UniversitySchool of Economics and Management
Kun Wang Tsinghua UniversitySchool of Economics and Management
Xing Xiao Tsinghua UniversitySchool of Economics and Management

Whose voice prevails in the board room?

Julan Du Chinese University of Hong KongChinese University of Hong Kong
Benny Lui Chinese University of Hong KongChinese University of Hong Kong
Oliver M. Rui Chinese University of Hong KongChinese University of Hong Kong

终极所有权、制度环境与上市公司债务融资基于控股股东决策视角的研究

俞红海 上海财经大学上海财经大学
徐龙炳 上海财经大学上海财经大学
陈百助 美国南加州大学马歇尔商学院


论文摘要

关联交易、盈余质量与股权制衡

罗忠洲 复旦大学金融研究院
周冬华 江西财经大学会计学院会计学院
赵玉洁 复旦大学国际金融系

本文以2003年至2009年上市公司的关联交易数据为样本,研究关联交易对盈余质量的影响,以及股权制衡对关联交易的制约关系。研究结果发现,关联交易显著地影响到盈余的质量,关联交易比例与盈余持续性负相关;股权制衡对上市公司与控股股东之间发生的关联交易有显著的遏制作用,股权制衡也有利于遏制上市公司利用关联交易进行再融资和避亏盈余管理行为。

Beyond Capital Allocation Efficiency

Ping He Tsinghua UniversitySchool of Economics and Management
Kun Wang Tsinghua UniversitySchool of Economics and Management
Xing Xiao Tsinghua UniversitySchool of Economics and Management

The controlling shareholder of a firm may suffer as a result of its right to control the firm due to unfavorable market reactions associated with concerns on private benefit extraction by the controlling shareholder. Thus, the controlling shareholder has an incentive to build a good governance mechanism as a commitment device in order to discipline itself, which allows it to sell shares at a higher price in the initial public offering (IPO). An improvement in pricing efficiency will give the controlling shareholder more incentive to limit its private benefits from controlling the firm. Therefore, we propose that, besides improving the efficiency of capital allocation, the development of the financial market can shape the corporate governance of firms in an economy, thus improving firm operation efficiency. A model of IPO is constructed to demonstrate this mechanism of market discipline. Using data from China stock market on the regulatory changes in IPO pricing and firm ownership structure, we find evidence consistent with the model’s implications.

Whose voice prevails in the board room?

Julan Du Chinese University of Hong KongChinese University of Hong Kong
Benny Lui Chinese University of Hong KongChinese University of Hong Kong
Oliver M. Rui Chinese University of Hong KongChinese University of Hong Kong

Many prior studies conclude that Chinese independent directors engage in window dressing. The results of research into the relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm performance are mixed. We use the number of negative opinions issued by a firm’s independent directors as a proxy for their effectiveness in the monitoring role they play. We hypothesize that both board structure and the personal characteristics of independent directors influence the effectiveness of monitoring. Using a matched control sample of firms in which there were no disputes in the board room over the sample period, we find that independent directors who have more political capital, such as former government officials, Communist Party members, and those who also have a senior management position in another firm are more likely to issue negative opinions. We also find that the independent directors of firms with more balanced power structure in board and those that operate in a better institutional environment have a greater tendency to issue negative opinions.

终极所有权、制度环境与上市公司债务融资基于控股股东决策视角的研究

俞红海 上海财经大学上海财经大学
徐龙炳 上海财经大学上海财经大学
陈百助 美国南加州大学马歇尔商学院

本文在现有“制度环境与债务融资”研究基础上,进一步结合终极所有权研究公司债务融资问题。理论上本文首次基于控股股东决策视角,通过动态模型研究发现,在利率管制的中国市场上,投资者法律保护不足及控股股东的存在,导致公司过度债务融资,政府干预进一步加剧了这一行为,控股股东现金流权可以有效抑制过度债务融资。实证研究表明,控股股东现金流权与过度债务融资显著负相关,法制环境的改善、政府干预减少显著降低了过度债务融资规模及过度长期债务融资。这一研究在验证本文理论分析的同时,为控股股东利用控制权侵占提供了新的证据。


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