中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

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工作论文
2011-02-24 第3卷 第2期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

上市公司民营化绩效:基于政治观点的检验

李广子 北京大学光华管理学院
刘力 北京大学光华管理学院

Financing Constraints, Ownership Control, and Cross-border M&As: the Evidence of Nine East Asian Economies

Yenn-Ru Chen National Cheng Kung UniversityGraduate Institute of Finance
Yu-Ling Huang National Cheng Kung UniversityGraduate Institute of Finance

Asset Substitution, Debt Overhang, and Optimal Capital Structure

Jyh-Bang Jou Massey University Albany CampusDepartment of Economics and Finance
Tan Lee Yuan Ze UniversityDepartment of International Business

政府干预、控制权私人收益与国有企业并购研究

郭海星 西安交通大学管理学院
李双燕 西安交通大学管理学院
万迪昉 西安交通大学管理学院


论文摘要

上市公司民营化绩效:基于政治观点的检验

李广子 北京大学光华管理学院
刘力北京大学光华管理学院

利用中国市场上剔除资产重组效应后的上市公司民营化样本,本文考察了所有权性质变更对上市公司绩效的影响。本文发现:(1)民营化后上市公司的绩效得到改善;(2)剔除资产重组效应后,与未发生控制权转让的配对国有上市公司样本以及国有企业间控制权转让样本相比,民营化能更有效地改善上市公司绩效;(3)民营化前后上市公司在经理人激励方面没有显著差别,民营化样本与未发生控制权转让的配对国有上市公司样本以及国有企业间控制权转让样本在经理人激励方面也没有显著差别。本文的证据支持了由Shleifer and Vishny(1994)所提出的政治观点。

Financing Constraints, Ownership Control, and Cross-border M&As: the Evidence of Nine East Asian Economies

Yenn-Ru Chen National Cheng Kung UniversityGraduate Institute of Finance
Yu-Ling Huang National Cheng Kung UniversityGraduate Institute of Finance

This study examines the effects of different dimensions of financing constraints (financial market development, governance environments, ownership control and other firm-specific characteristics) on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for all takeover bids announced in nine East Asian economies from 1998 to 2005. The results of logistic regressions verify that the extent of stock market and governance developments encourages cross-border M&As in this region. The results also indicate that firm-specific financing constraints, except the ownership control variables, reduce the occurrence of cross-border M&As related to domestic M&As. Although family- and state-controlled firms have better access to external financing, they are reluctant to risk diluting their management control and thus prefers less cross-border M&As to domestic M&As. This study enhances the empirical studies of the financing constraint-investment relation based on the market imperfection theory in corporate finance theories. Information asymmetry is the main reason causing the market imperfection and leading to financing constraints to corporate investments. This study, by examining the relation over nine East Asian firms, thus provides an understanding of how such a relation fits in the firms in countries where information asymmetry is high.

Asset Substitution, Debt Overhang, and Optimal Capital Structure

Jyh-Bang Jou Massey University Albany CampusDepartment of Economics and Finance
Tan Lee Yuan Ze UniversityDepartment of International Business

This article uses a contingent-claims valuation method to compare debt financing, investment, and risk choices of a firm adopting the second-best strategy with those of a firm adopting the first-best strategy. The former bears the agency costs, as conjectured by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), because it chooses suboptimal investment timing and risk levels, while the latter is able to avoid them. For plausible parameter values, we find that the second-best firm that takes on more debt will under-invest and bear excessive risk. We also find that the agency costs of debt are 15.8% of the first-best firm value, which is higher than that found by Leland (1998) and Mauer and Sarkar (2005).

政府干预、控制权私人收益与国有企业并购研究

郭海星 西安交通大学管理学院
李双燕 西安交通大学管理学院
万迪昉 西安交通大学管理学院

以中国制度环境为背景,研究了国有企业的收购与反收购动机。通过构建 企业收购与反收购模型,考察了管理者控制权私人收益对并购动机的影响,结果发现 如果政府干预补偿了管理者的控制权私人收益,则管理者越有动机进行反收购;如果 政府干预降低了控制权私人收益,则管理者没有反收购动机。模型还发现管理者持股 比率、公司规模、自然世界状态均对企业并购行为有显著影响。


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