中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

公司财务--资本结构
工作论文
2010-12-15 第3卷 第6期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

最优消费投资与破产保护

杨金强 湖南大学金融与统计学院
杨招军 湖南大学金融与统计学院

融资约束、债务能力与公司业绩:自然实验的证据

李科 上海财经大学金融学院
徐龙炳 上海财经大学金融学院

Optimal Capital Structure, Capacity Choice and Product Market Competition

Chu Yongqiang University of South CarolinaMoore School of Business

Capital Structure and Product Market Competition Advantage: The Empirical Evidence from Chinese State-Controlled and Private Listed Companies

TAN Duo-jiao Hubei University of EconomicsAccounting School
ZHANG Zhao-guo Huazhong University of Science &TechnologyManagement School

Capital Budgeting and Innovation in a Firm

Jiang Luo Nanyang Technological UniversityNanyang Technological University
V. Ravi Anshuman Indian Institute of ManagementIndian Institute of Management


论文摘要

最优消费投资与破产保护

杨金强 湖南大学金融与统计学院
杨招军 湖南大学金融与统计学院

本文考虑一个面临经营性风险(非系统风险)的企业家,在给定的债务及企业所得税率下,如何通过消费平滑、企业资本投资、破产保护以及金融风险投资,实现消费效用最大化的公司金融问题。本文得到了非风险中性下企业资本价值的半闭式解及相应的最优经营策略和最优破产阀值。对应经典的资本资产定价(CAPM)理论,得到了企业家的期望收益率、贝塔系数、系统风险溢价和非系统风险溢价(idiosyncratic risk premium)。不同于传统观点,非系统风险溢价严格大于零。这些结论和数值计算表明,企业家的风险态度对企业资本价值、最优资本结构,资本投资策略、破产水平、贝塔系数、非系统风险溢价、期望收益率等具有显著的影响。

融资约束、债务能力与公司业绩:自然实验的证据

李科上海财经大学金融学院
徐龙炳 上海财经大学金融学院

本文利用短期融资券的推出作为自然实验研究金融创新引起的公司融资约束变化对公司经营业绩的影响,从而为金融发展与经济增长的关系提供微观证据。利用短期融资券作为自然实验,本文解决了在研究金融发展与经济增长关系中的内生性问题。基于两者关系中“分配金融资源”的理论观点:金融发展能够更加有效的分配资金资源,减少公司的融资约束,增加公司的业绩,本文提供了这一经济作用机制的实证证据。本文发现当短期融资券成为企业潜在的融资工具后,能够利用这一金融工具的企业在负债能力和投资能力方面有了大幅提高,其经营业绩也得到大幅增长。本文的证据表明金融工具创新和金融市场发展对公司价值产生了巨大影响,因此能够促进经济增长。

Optimal Capital Structure, Capacity Choice and Product Market Competition

Chu Yongqiang University of South CarolinaMoore School of Business

This paper develops a dynamic trade-off model to study the interaction between product market competition and capital structure. Firms make interdependent entry, investment, financing and default decisions. Trade-off between tax benefits, bankruptcy costs and strategic considerations in the product market determines optimal capital structure. The model delivers the following results that are consistent with empirical evidences: (1) Firms may have non-linear and non-monotonic reactions to their competitors’ change of leverage, depending on their original levels of leverage; (2) The within-industry variation of leverage can be large, because incumbents and entrants use leverage strategically differently ; (3) Entrants have higher leverage than incumbents in equilibrium, because the incumbents use lower leverage to gain strategic advantages over the entrants.

Capital Structure and Product Market Competition Advantage: The Empirical Evidence from Chinese State-Controlled and Private Listed Companies

TAN Duo-jiao Hubei University of EconomicsAccounting School
ZHANG Zhao-guo Huazhong University of Science &TechnologyManagement School

The relationship between capital structure and product market competition is recently a new research field and hot topic in the study of capital structure. Focuses on Chinese state-controlled and private listed companies, this paper concludes that private listed companies have greater competition advantages than the state-controlled listed companies through empirical study of the relationship between capital structure and product market competition. The policy implication of this conclusion is that favorable capital structure helps to improve the corporate governance structure and strengthen the product market competition advantage of the listed companies. To improve the quality of Chinese listed companies, Chinese government is strongly recommended to take powerful measures to promote the process of privatization and economic performance of the economic entities.

Capital Budgeting and Innovation in a Firm

Jiang Luo Nanyang Technological UniversityNanyang Technological University
V. Ravi Anshuman Indian Institute of ManagementIndian Institute of Management

We examine how a firm designs capital allocation and managerial compensation schemes to motivate a privately informed manager to (i) engage in innovative activity to search for, and (ii) guide the firm to invest in, a new investment project. We show that relative to the first-best, the firm allocates too little capital and provides too few incentives for the manager to expend innovative effort; the manager may violate the NPV rule by investing the allocated capital in a project with negative productivity. We provide several novel predictions that help identify firms that are likely to innovate and managers who are likely to follow the NPV rule. We also show that uncertainty and incentive pay can be positively related.


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