中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

银行和金融机构--银行和金融机构
工作论文
2011-08-18 第4卷 第3期

编: 麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院金融学讲席教授,清华大学经管学院特聘教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

Research on the Credit Collusion-proof in Chinese Commercial Banks

Zhongfei Chen Wuhan University of TechnologySchool of Economics

转型期中国金融发展的生产率效应(博士生论坛征文)

闫海洲 上海社会科学院部门经济研究所

Theoretical Study on Bank’s Behavior in Mortgage Loan to Real Estate Construction in Progress

Zhu Xiang-cheng East China Normal UniversitySchool of Business
Ye De-Lei East China Normal UniversitySchool of Business

晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为(博士生论坛征文)

钱先航 南开大学公司治理研究中心
曹廷求 山东大学经济学院金融系
李维安 南开大学公司治理研究中心

Does Informal Finance Help Formal Finance? Evidence from Third Party Loan Guarantees in China

Chenyu SHAN The University of Hong KongSchool of Economics and Finance


论文摘要

Research on the Credit Collusion-proof in Chinese Commercial Banks

Zhongfei Chen Wuhan University of TechnologySchool of Economics

The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.

转型期中国金融发展的生产率效应(博士生论坛征文)

闫海洲 上海社会科学院部门经济研究所

基于金融系统论之上,本文提出了考察金融发展的三个纬度,在金融发展与内生经济增长的理论背景下,对转型期中国金融发展的生产率效率进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,转型期中国金融发展规模的生产率效应为负,金融结构的生产效率效应为正,金融效率的生产率效应为正;随着经济发展水平的变化,金融发展对经济增长的生产率效应也表现出不同的作用;同时,来自于区域和不同发展水平的分类实证检验也说明了金融发展生产率效应区域的差异性和非线性关系。

Theoretical Study on Bank’s Behavior in Mortgage Loan to Real Estate Construction in Progress

Zhu Xiang-cheng East China Normal UniversitySchool of Business
Ye De-Lei East China Normal UniversitySchool of Business

There are several kinds of risks among bank, Real estate developer and assessment agency in mortgage loan of construction in progress. The risks were respectively analyzed theoretically by the game models based on the experience inductive of reverse selection between bank and assessment agency and moral hazard between bank and real estate developer. Conclusion can be according to the models drawn as following: long-term cooperation should be introduced between bank and assessment agency, D/V should be appropriately set by bank and hence the optimal strategy of bank should be to launch loan.

晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为(博士生论坛征文)

钱先航 南开大学公司治理研究中心
曹廷求 山东大学经济学院金融系
李维安 南开大学公司治理研究中心

基于晋升激励的视角,本文以我国城市商业银行样本验证了政府股东的“政治观”。我们考察了地方官员的晋升压力及任期对当地城商行贷款行为的影响,并探讨了城商行不良贷款的形成机制及如何修正官员考核体系以抑制不良贷款的累积。结果表明晋升压力大时,当地城商行会减少贷款量,但官员任期会弱化这种作用;从期限结构来看,减少的都是短期贷款,且会增加中长期贷款。同时城商行会减少批发、制造业贷款而增加建筑、房地产业贷款,也会有较低的拨备覆盖率和较高的集中度、关联贷款及不良贷款率,且除关联贷款之外,官员任期大多对二者关系有一定的强化作用。进一步的研究显示晋升压力的增强会通过增加城商行的建筑和房地产业贷款、降低拨备覆盖率、提高集中度的途径形成不良贷款,并且在官员考核中增加环境、民生指标的比重能够有效抑制城商行不良贷款的累积。

Does Informal Finance Help Formal Finance? Evidence from Third Party Loan Guarantees in China

Chenyu SHAN The University of Hong KongSchool of Economics and Finance

Building on the important study by Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) and Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010), I examine whether third party guarantors play an effective role in assessing loan risk. Using a proprietary database of third party loan guarantees in China, I find strong evidence that guarantors and banks disagree on pricing loan risk, and that banks can better predict loan defaults than guarantors. I also find that the probability of loan default is affected by the capability of guarantor officers. My findings question the contribution of soft information in the improvement of credit scoring and support the view that informal finance should be limited. This paper also supports the implications of studies on human capital in financial intermediation.


      中国金融研究学术网(China Financial Research Network)发表金融研究工作论文和已发表论文的摘要。
      
      如果您如希望按期收到最新的金融研究工作论文和已发表论文的摘要,请访问http://www.cfrn.com.cn,注册即可。
      
      您如果想要发表您的工作论文或已发表论文的摘要,请访问http://www.cfrn.com.cn,注册,登录,然后上传。
      
      中国金融研究学术网不拥有所发表的工作论文和已发表论文摘要的版权。读者可以免费浏览和下载。      
	  
      如果您有任何问题,请联系我们。通过E-Mail发送至:cfrn@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn。或者通过邮寄方式,寄送至:清华大学经济管理学院中国金融研究中心。邮编:100084。
      

Copyright @ 2008 China Center for Financial Research,Tsinghua University. All Rights Reserved.
版权所有 清华大学中国金融研究中心