CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK
2011-08-18 第4卷 第3期
Wuhan University of TechnologySchool of Economics
East China Normal UniversitySchool of Business
The University of Hong KongSchool of Economics and Finance
Zhongfei Chen Wuhan University of TechnologySchool of Economics
The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.
Zhu Xiang-cheng East China Normal UniversitySchool of Business
There are several kinds of risks among bank, Real estate developer and assessment agency in mortgage loan of construction in progress. The risks were respectively analyzed theoretically by the game models based on the experience inductive of reverse selection between bank and assessment agency and moral hazard between bank and real estate developer. Conclusion can be according to the models drawn as following: long-term cooperation should be introduced between bank and assessment agency, D/V should be appropriately set by bank and hence the optimal strategy of bank should be to launch loan.
Chenyu SHAN The University of Hong KongSchool of Economics and Finance
Building on the important study by Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) and Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010), I examine whether third party guarantors play an effective role in assessing loan risk. Using a proprietary database of third party loan guarantees in China, I find strong evidence that guarantors and banks disagree on pricing loan risk, and that banks can better predict loan defaults than guarantors. I also find that the probability of loan default is affected by the capability of guarantor officers. My findings question the contribution of soft information in the improvement of credit scoring and support the view that informal finance should be limited. This paper also supports the implications of studies on human capital in financial intermediation.
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