CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK
2011-08-18 第4卷 第3期
Wuhan University of TechnologySchool of Economics
East China Normal UniversitySchool of Business
The University of Hong KongSchool of Economics and Finance
Zhongfei Chen Wuhan University of TechnologySchool of Economics
The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.