中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

公司财务--公司治理
工作论文
2012-06-07 第5卷 第4期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

最终控制人特征与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

毕超 内蒙古财经学院会计学院
魏喆妍 内蒙古财经学院会计学院

Cash versus Stock Dividends: Signalling or Catering

Xi He The Australian National UniversitySchool of Finance and Applied Statistics
Mingsheng Li Bowling Green State UniversityCollege of Business Administration
Jing Shi The Australian National UniversitySchool of Finance and Applied Statistics
Garry Twite The Australian National UniversitySchool of Finance and Applied Statistics

媒体治理与中小投资者保护

徐莉萍 中山大学管理学院
辛宇 中山大学管理学院

Causes and Consequences of Corporate Assets Exchange by China’s Listed Companies

Jiwei Wang Singapore Management UniversitySchool of management
Hongqi Yuan Fudan UniversitySchool of management


论文摘要

最终控制人特征与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

毕超内蒙古财经学院会计学院
魏喆妍 内蒙古财经学院会计学院

会计稳健性,作为会计的基本原则之一,近年来受到了学术界的极大关注。基于稳健性的契约性解释,Watts(2003)认为会计稳健性是一种有效的公司治理机制。然而基于中国的制度背景,我们认为会计稳健性的契约性解释在中国并不适用。本文从最终控制人角度,利用中国A股市场2004至2009年的7146个公司—年数据对最终控制人特征与会计稳健性之间的关系进行了检验,并进一步探讨了中国上市公司中会计稳健性存在的根本动因。经验证据发现,会计稳健性在我国资本市场上伴随着控制权私利的存在而存在,并且最终控制人为了掩盖其“掏空”行为会利用稳健的会计信息来隐藏其所获得的控制权私利。研究结果表明,在我们国家的资本市场中,会计稳健性并不能作为一种有效的公司治理机制而存在。

Cash versus Stock Dividends: Signalling or Catering

Xi He The Australian National UniversitySchool of Finance and Applied Statistics
Mingsheng Li Bowling Green State UniversityCollege of Business Administration
Jing Shi The Australian National UniversitySchool of Finance and Applied Statistics
Garry Twite The Australian National UniversitySchool of Finance and Applied Statistics

The Chinese market is characterized by state-controlled and closely held firms as well as significant differences in economic development and legal structures at the provincial level and corporate regulations that require firms seeking external financing to show a history of dividend payment. Using a sample of listed Chinese firms, we investigate the firm’s choice of cash or stock dividends and market reactions to the announcement of these dividend choices. We find that profitable, low leverage, high cash holding, stronger shareholder protection firms, and those firms with state ownership prior to listing and undertaking subsequent equity offerings are more likely to pay dividends and cash dividends, in particular. In addition, we find that growing firms with high levels of retained earnings and investing more in fixed assets pay stock dividends. Firms appear to cater to investor demands in setting dividend policy; hence firms with a large proportion of non-tradable shares are more likely to pay cash dividends. Consistent with the use of stock dividends to attract the attention of analysts, we find that the announcement of a stock dividend initiation is associated with significant positive market reactions and increased analyst following.

媒体治理与中小投资者保护

徐莉萍 中山大学管理学院
辛宇中山大学管理学院

本文考察媒体在股权分置改革及流通股股东分类表决的制度安排下所发挥的治理职能。研究表明,作为宏观治理环境的一个重要组成部分,媒体在股权分置改革中发挥着非常重要的治理作用。在控制其它影响因素的前提下,媒体关注程度越高,治理环境越好,“公司治理溢价”越高,信息环境和信息质量越有保证,非流通股股东的私有利益越小,中小流通股股东所面临的信息风险越低,相应地,其所要求的实际对价也会相对较低。反之,中小流通股股东会向那些媒体关注程度较低公司的非流通股股东要求更高的对价。同时,密集的媒体披露水平可以明显影响甚至强化非流通股持股对实际对价所产生的正向相关关系。分组回归分析的结果表明这些媒体的公司治理职能仅在中小流通股股东对实际对价高度满意的研究样本中存在。进一步地,媒体的这些公司治理职能的发挥主要是通过提高中小流通股股东参与股改投票的热情、进而使其自身意见更有可能在分类表决中得到体现来加以实现的。

Causes and Consequences of Corporate Assets Exchange by China’s Listed Companies

Jiwei Wang Singapore Management UniversitySchool of management
Hongqi Yuan Fudan UniversitySchool of management

China’s listed companies often exchange corporate assets with their unlisted affiliates such as parent companies, which is rarely observed in their American counterparts. We find that listed companies which are incompletely restructured from former state-owned enterprises tend to exchange more profitable assets for less profitable assets (i.e., tunneling). However, when there is a need to avoid reporting losses and to raise additional capital, listed companies tend to exchange less profitable assets for more profitable assets (i.e., propping). We also find that the market reacts indifferently to assets exchange announcement. Finally, we find that assets exchange with tunneling (propping) incentive is associated with detrimental (improved) post-exchange stock performance and financial performance. In summary, this study contributes to the corporate assets literature by providing two new incentives (tunneling and propping).


      中国金融研究学术网(China Financial Research Network)发表金融研究工作论文和已发表论文的摘要。
      
      如果您如希望按期收到最新的金融研究工作论文和已发表论文的摘要,请访问http://www.cfrn.com.cn,注册即可。
      
      您如果想要发表您的工作论文或已发表论文的摘要,请访问http://www.cfrn.com.cn,注册,登录,然后上传。
      
      中国金融研究学术网不拥有所发表的工作论文和已发表论文摘要的版权。读者可以免费浏览和下载。      
	  
      如果您有任何问题,请联系我们。通过E-Mail发送至:cfrn@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn。或者通过邮寄方式,寄送至:清华大学经济管理学院中国金融研究中心。邮编:100084。
      

Copyright @ 2008 China Center for Financial Research,Tsinghua University. All Rights Reserved.
版权所有 清华大学中国金融研究中心