Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors:Evidence from Individual Director Voting
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发布日期:2013年10月24日 上次修订日期:2022年03月09日

摘要

Using a director-level dataset of board proposal voting by independent directors of public companies, we analyze the effects of career concerns and current reputation stock on independent directors in their voting behavior. Younger directors and directors in their second (and last) terms, who have stronger career concerns, are more likely to be aligned with investors rather than the managers. Their dissenting behavior is eventually rewarded in the market place in the form of more outside career opportunities. Directors with higher reputation stocks (measured by positive news media mentioning and the number of directorships) are also more likely to dissent. Finally, we find that career concerns are significantly stronger among directors who already enjoy higher reputation.

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相关文献

Wei Jiang ; Hualin Wan ; Shan Zhao ; Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors:Evidence from Individual Director Voting (2013年10月24日)http://www.cfrn.com.cn//lw/gsjr/gszllw/4164.htm

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