摘要

We investigate how a firm’s political connections may affect its corporate policies. We propose and test the hypothesis that firms’ political connections enhance investors’ endorsement of managerial decisions, which elevates firm investment and encourages equity issuance and less cash payout. Using a sample of non-state owned Chinese firms, we find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. Specifically, politically connected firms are less likely to pay dividends and pay less if they pay. The dividend announcement returns are significantly lower in connected firms than in otherwise similar but unconnected firms. Investors prefer firm investments to cash payouts by politically connected firms with high growth opportunities, and tend to value these firms’ investment decisions significantly higher. Finally, connected firms are also more able to tap public equity market for external funds. Our evidence is more consistent with political connections being an investor endorsement device rather than the expropriation device as suggested in the prior literature.

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Jerry Cao ; Sheng Huang ; Qigui Liu ; Gary Gang Tian ; Political Connections as an Endorsement Device (2013年11月23日)http://www.cfrn.com.cn//lw/gsjr/gszllw/4187.htm

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