DO SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS SAY “BUY” WHILE WHISPERING “SELL”?
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发布日期:2022年06月06日 上次修订日期:2022年06月06日

摘要

We examine how sell-side equity analysts strategically disclose information of differing quality to the public versus the buy-side mutual fund managers to whom they are connected. We consider cases in which analysts recommend that the public buys a stock, but some fund managers sell it. We measure favor trading using mutual fund managers’ votes for analysts in a Chinese “star analyst” competition. We find that managers are more likely to vote for analysts who exhibit more “say-buy/whisper-sell” behavior with these managers. This suggests that analysts introduce noise in their public recommendations, making the more-precise information provided to their private clients more valuable. Analysts’ say-buy/whisper-sell behavior results in information asymmetry: the positive-recommendation stocks bought by the managers who vote for the analysts outperform the stocks sold by these managers after the recommendation dates. Our findings help explain several puzzles regarding analysts’ public recommendations.

David Hirshleifer ; Yushui Shi ; Weili Wu ; DO SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS SAY “BUY” WHILE WHISPERING “SELL”? (2022年06月06日)http://www.cfrn.com.cn//lw/zbsc/tzjjlw/85a6d824547e4f73b350d8c20b4f6e38.htm

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